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【Abstract】Feminist critics of evolutionary psychology are often accused of committing 
the naturalistic fallacy, that is, of inferring certain normative conclusions from 
evolutionary psychology’s purely descriptive accounts. This article refutes the accusation 
of the naturalistic fallacy, by showing that evolutionary psychology’s accounts of 
human behavior are not purely descriptive, but rather grounded on biased value 
judgments. A paradigmatic example is Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s well-known 
book A Natural History of Rape. I argue that at least three biased judgments are at 
work in Thornhill and Palmer’s evolutionary psychology account of rape: (1) 
adaptationist approaches to evolution, (2) willful ignorance of cultural and social 
context, and (3) binary understanding of gender and sex. In that Thornhill and 
Palmer’s account cannot hold without the three biased value judgments, it is not a 
purely factual description of rape. Therefore, feminist concerns over its normative 
implications do not commit the naturalistic fallacy, as it is not the case that they 
infer a normative conclusion from a pure description.
1. The Naturalistic Fallacy: A Charge against Feminist 
Critiques of Evolutionary Psychology
This paper aims to defend feminist critiques of evolutionary psychology. 
More specifically, I present a rebuttal to the argument that feminist 
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philosophers of science commit the naturalistic fallacy when they critically 
examine evolutionary psychology’s approach to gendered behavior. 
Evolutionary psychology is a research approach that examines how 
evolutionary processes, including natural selection, have shaped the human 
mind.1) One of its key assumptions is that “the programs comprising the 
human mind were designed by natural selection to solve the adaptive problems 
regularly faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. [That is,] each evolved 
program exists because it produced behavior that promoted the survival and 
reproduction of our ancestors better than alternative programs that arose during 
human evolutionary history.”2) In this sense, many evolutionary psychologists 
claim that their research programs provide some “cross-culturally universal” 
frameworks for understanding human behavior. Understanding the evolved 
mechanisms of the human mind offers ultimate explanations of human 
behavior, they argue, which is more systematic and fundamental than 
proximate explanations provided by social and cultural analyses.3) 
As evolutionary psychology has become popular both within and outside 
academia, successfully framing itself an ultimate scientific explanation for 
human nature and social phenomena,4) it has also received considerable critical 
attention of philosophers.5) In particular, many feminist philosophers have 
1) Barrett(2015), 1-2.
2) Tooby and Cosmides(2005), 16.
3) Tooby and Cosmides(2005), 18.
4) A considerable number of philosophers have argued that evolutionary 
psychology provides useful frameworks for understanding human behavior. 
See, for example, Fodor(1983), Cosmides(1989), Cosmides and Tooby(2005), 
Carruthers(2006), 윤보석(2010), 장대익⋅이민섭(2018), to name a few. 
5) As Huneman and Machery(2015) note, philosophers of biology have been 
the main critics of evolutionary psychology. See, for example, Buller(2015) 
and Richardson(2007). I will discuss other critiques from philosophers of 
biology as I proceed through my argument. For critical analyses of 
evolutionary psychology developed by philosophers in South Korea, see 
천현득(2009), 김요한(2019), 조현진(2019).
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raised concerns over “the social and political implications of research that 
stays consistent with and reinforces dangerous gender stereotypes.”6) 
Evolutionary psychology research that claims to provide universal accounts of, 
for example, how girls and boys come to prefer feminine and masculine toys 
respectively,7) why men have a better sense of direction than women,8) and 
how rape is an evolved adaptation9) may perpetuate gender biases and 
discrimination against women. This is a valid concern, especially in societies 
such as South Korea where there are increasing discussions on gender 
equality. The accounts that there are “natural,” “scientific” roots of gender 
stereotypes and power inequalities between women and men can hinder equity. 
For instance, the supposed evolutionary bases of rape could send the wrong 
message that the crime is excusable, which undermines feminist efforts to 
eliminate sexual violence such as the worldwide #MeToo movement and 
women’s rallies in South Korea to protest against spy cameras (molka).10)
In response to the criticism, evolutionary psychologists tend to argue that 
feminist critics commit the naturalistic fallacy.11) The term “naturalistic 
fallacy,” which originated from David Hume and G. E. Moore,12) indicates 
6) Fehr(2012), 55. The special issue published by Hypatia: A Journal of 
Feminist Philosophy in Winter 2012 (Meyers ed. 2012) contains important 
feminist critiques of evolutionary psychology, which I will discuss in this 
article. Other useful analyses from feminist philosophers include O’Donavan 
(2013) and Meynell(2021). It is worth noting that, in South Korea, 김성한
(2006; 2008) has maintained that evolutionary psychology does not justify 
sexism. In contrast, 조현진(2015) argues the opposite-evolutionary psychology 
is sexually biased-through a careful analysis of the massive modularity thesis. 
7) Alexander and Hines(2002).
8) Groen et al.(2000).
9) Thornhill and Palmer(2000).
10) Hasunuma and Shin(2019), Lee(2018).
11) Nelson(2017), 264-266.
12) Hume(1739-1740), Moore(1903). For more details about Hume and Moore’s 
conceptions of the naturalistic fallacy, see Wilson et al.(2003), 670-671; 
Teehan and diCarlo(2004), 34-36.
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that one cannot infer normative conclusions directly from descriptive statements. 
Since factual descriptions of how the world “is” do not imply any evaluative 
claim, it is fallacious to deduce normativity (“ought”) and values (“good,” 
“bad,” etc.) exclusively from descriptions. Appealing to this notion of the 
naturalistic fallacy, a typical counterargument from evolutionary psychologists 
unfolds as follows. They claim, first, that what evolutionary psychology does 
is to provide descriptions of the evolution of a human behavior x (for 
example, rape), neither to endorse x as morally good nor to claim that people 
ought to do x; and second, that feminist critics erroneously assume that 
evolutionary psychology’s purely factual descriptions imply certain normative 
conclusions (for example, rape is morally innocent or even desirable). 
One such argument is made by Benjamin Winegard and colleagues, who 
survey undergraduate gender studies textbooks accuse them of committing the 
naturalistic fallacy. According to Winegard et al., many gender/sex textbooks 
state as if evolutionary psychology’s empirical statements about “what exists” 
were the normative statement that “what exists is either ipso facto good or 
morally desirable simply because it exists.”13) In response to gender studies’ 
critiques of evolutionary psychology, Winegard and colleagues use a well-known 
quote by Richard Dawkins: “I am not advocating a morality based on 
evolution. I am saying how things have evolved. I am not saying how we 
humans morally ought to behave.”14)
Another significant example is Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s book 
titled A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion. Taking 
an evolutionary approach to human rape, Thornhill and Palmer explain rape in 
terms of a natural biological act. The key thesis of the book is that rape is 
either “an adaptation that was directly favored by selection because it 
increased male reproductive success by way of increasing mate number”15) or 
13) Winegard et al.(2014), 480.
14) Dawkins(1976), 2-3.
15) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 59.
Evolutionary Psychology, Rape, and the Naturalistic Fallacy / Kong, Youjin ║ 69
“a by-product of other adaptations
-
including those of men’s great interest in 
and pursuit of impersonal sex
-
that exist because of their promotion of male 
reproductive success in contexts other than rape.”16) That is, human rape has 
evolved as an evolutionary adaptation itself, or at least it is a by-product of 
other evolutionary adaptations. (The following sections will delve into Thornhill 
and Palmer’s argument more thoroughly.) 
Unsurprisingly, the evolutionary account of rape has provoked much 
criticism from feminist researchers. Many feminist philosophers of science as 
well as social scientists have aptly pointed out that, although Thornhill and 
Palmer would not personally endorse rape, their explanation of the evolutionary 
roots of rape could make rape look “less bad” or “less immoral.”17) For example, 
Peggy Reeves Sanday notes:
I suggest that by seeing rape mainly as a product of human evolution, the 
evolutionary argument provides scientific support for the well-known popular 
belief in U.S. society that “boys will be boys” and “girls ask for it.” 
Although Thornhill and Palmer neither condone rape nor see it as good 
socially or psychologically, their arguments are nonetheless part of the same 
cultural selection process that legitimizes a discourse that looks the other way 
when young males rape on the grounds that they are, after all, only human.18)
That is, the evolutionary account contributes to perpetuating the culture that 
condones rape by suggesting that rape is a “natural” human male behavior.
Thornhill and Palmer invoke the concept of the naturalistic fallacy to 
answer this type of criticism. According to the two authors, the underlying 
assumption of feminist critiques is that “if rape was favored by “natural” 
selection, it must be “natural” and hence good or at least excusable.”19) They 
16) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 63.
17) Most notably, the edited volume Evolution, Gender, and Rape (Travis ed. 
2003) contains seventeen critiques of Thornhill and Palmer’s work. For 
recent critiques, see Alcoff(2018), Weaver and Fehr(2017), and Weaver(2019).
18) Sanday(2003), 342-343.
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mention the naturalistic fallacy several times in their book, which include the 
following:
A trait that increases [reproductive success] is “good” in terms of natural 
selection even though one might consider it undesirable in moral terms. 
There is no connection here between what is biological or naturally selected 
and what is morally right or wrong. To assume a connection is to commit 
what is called the naturalistic fallacy.20) 
Would that [human rape was an adaptation] imply that rape was “natural” 
and therefore good? […] We think not. To think otherwise is to fall prey to 
the naturalistic fallacy.21) 
Here, Thornhill and Palmer’s argument against feminist critiques-along with 
other evolutionary psychologists’ rebuttal to those critiques-has the following 
structure:
⋅ Premise 1. Accounts of human behavior that evolutionary psychology 
presents are descriptions of natural facts. For example, Thornhill and 
Palmer’s conclusion that “rape is naturally selected” is a factual/ 
descriptive statement.
⋅ Premise 2. It is erroneous to deduce evaluative/normative statements 
directly from factual/descriptive statements (i.e., the naturalistic fallacy).
⋅ Premise 3. Feminist critiques of evolutionary psychology argue that 
evolutionary accounts on gender, sex, and sexuality has problematic 
implications. According to their view, the statement that “rape is 
naturally selected” implies evaluative/normative statements such as 
“rape is good” or “rape is not ethically wrong.” That is, they deduce 
the latter statements from the former.
⋅ Conclusion. Therefore, feminist critiques of evolutionary psychology 
commit the naturalistic fallacy.
19) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 121.
20) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 5-6.
21) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 84.
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This paper seeks to refute the accusation of the naturalistic fallacy against 
feminist critiques of evolutionary psychology, by using Thornhill and Palmer’s 
work as a paradigmatic case. I will demonstrate that Premise 1 is false, and 
therefore, the Conclusion does not follow. In order for evolutionary 
psychologists like Thornhill and Palmer to successfully charge their critics 
with the naturalistic fallacy, their evolutionary accounts of human behavior 
must be factual/descriptive statements. However, Thornhill and Palmer’s 
account of rape is not a pure description of natural facts. Their research 
conclusion that rape is an evolved mechanism is, as I will demonstrate in the 
next section, permeated with and founded on their biased value judgments.22) 
Because their evolutionary account is not entirely descriptive, to raise ethical 
and social concerns about it (that is, to derive normative implications from 
their research conclusion) is not a case of the naturalistic fallacy. 
Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify what exactly is 
fallacious about the naturalistic fallacy. On the one hand, when evolutionary 
psychologists use the term naturalistic fallacy, it typically refers to the 
misbelief that something is (a) “ethically acceptable simply because it is 
natural.”23) For example, Thornhill and Palmer claim that rape being a natural 
biological behavior does not legitimize it. On the other, the naturalistic fallacy 
22) My argument draws on Nils-Frederic Wagner and Georg Northoff’s 
discussion of the naturalistic fallacy (or the lack of thereof) in neuroethics. 
According to them, neuroethical arguments often have what they refer to 
as “semi-normative claims”-i.e., claims that are not entirely empirical but 
rather have some question-begging normative assumptions-as extra 
premises, in order to avoid inferring a normative conclusion directly from 
an empirical premise. When such claims are added to an empirical 
statement, it helps to deduce a neuroethical conclusion that justifies the 
smuggled normative assumption (Wagner and Northoff 2015, 220-227). I 
argue that Thornhill and Palmer’s “biased value judgments” play a similar 
but more active role than semi-normative claims: Thornhill and Palmer’s 
biased judgments are not merely added to, but rather actively shape and 
ground, their theory of rape.
23) Wilson et al.(2003), 672.
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is often used interchangeably with (b) the fact vs. value distinction, which 
does not allow “deriving value statements from purely factual statements.”24) 
In this sense, the naturalistic fallacy indicates that, unless there is an 
additional premise, it is illogical to deduce value only from a value-free 
observation of natural facts.25)
To be sure, (a) and (b) are closely related to and not clearly distinguished 
from each other. Here I make a conceptual distinction between the two types 
of the naturalistic fallacy in order to consider a possible rebuttal from 
evolutionary psychologists. They might claim that my critique of evolutionary 
psychology relies on equivocation, switching the meaning of the naturalistic 
fallacy from (a) to (b). That is, if the only reason that I argue feminist 
critiques are not committing the naturalistic fallacy is because evolutionary 
psychology’s observations are not purely factual, evolutionary psychologists 
might respond: Sure, we acknowledge that, but that’s not the problem we 
mean when we speak of the naturalistic fallacy. Thanks to the development of 
philosophy of science discussions,26) there has been a growing recognition in 
science communities that no research is perfectly value-neutral. The selection 
of research topic, method, and literature requires some evaluative judgments 
(e.g., why certain topic is “better” than others), and researchers are always 
“situated” in socio-historical context whose values affect and shape their perceptions. 
In this regard, Thornhill and Palmer might say that they admit the inevitable 
value-ladenness of their observation, and yet, it is still fallacious to infer rape 
being morally good from their observation that rape is naturally selected.27) 
What I mean by saying that Premise 1 is false
-
that is, by saying that 
evolutionary accounts of human behavior are not purely factual
-
is not just 
that evolutionary psychology research involves some value judgments (about, 
24) Teehan and DiCarlo(2004), 32-33.
25) Teehan and DiCarlo(2004), 34.
26) See, for example, Hanson(1965), Haraway(1988), and Harding(1992).
27) I thank an anonymous reviewer for their insights on this discussion.
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e.g., research topic selection) that are unavoidable for all kinds of scientific 
research. I argue that evolutionary psychology’s approach to gendered behavior 
is produced on the basis of and reproduces biased value judgments, not just 
some inevitable value judgments. By “biased” value judgments, I refer to 
those that are hardly justifiable in terms of epistemology and/or ethics. 
Admittedly, there is no clear standard for determining whether a value 
judgment is justifiable or not. Nevertheless, there seems to be enough ground 
to say that the evolutionary account of rape is grounded on some epistemically 
and ethically “suspicious” choices, which disregard other existing and possible 
explanations, as well as reflect and reproduce (rather than challenge) 
hetero-cis-sexist biases. More specifically, Thornhill and Palmer make at least 
three types of biased move28) in their book. The following sections will 
elaborate on each of the three moves: They overemphasize the importance of 
adaptation in evolutionary process and methodology (section 2.1), dismiss 
cultural and social context of rape behaviors (section 2.2), and adopt binary 
frameworks of gender, sex, and sexuality when interpreting empirical data 
(section 2.3). The point is that, without these three biased choices, Thornhill 
and Palmer’s evolutionary account cannot hold. Insofar as their account of 
rape is pervaded with and inseparable from the biased evaluative judgments, it 
is not a factual description of rape. And insofar as their account of rape is 
not a pure description, the charge of the naturalistic fallacy against their 
feminist critics is untenable, since it is not the case that the critics derive 
normative conclusions from a description.
28) In addition to “evaluative statements,” this paper will use generic terms 
such as “evaluative moves/choices/judgments,” whose meaning is not restricted 
to propositional statements but also encompasses non-propositional attitudes 
accompanied by everyday bias.
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2. Biased Value Judgments that 
Ground Evolutionary Psychology of Rape
2.1. Two Types of Adaptationism: Strong Pan-Selectionism and 
Strong Heuristic Adaptationism 
According to Thornhill and Palmer, there are only two reasonable accounts 
of rape: rape has evolved as an adaptation or as a by-product of adaptations. 
That is, rape is a trait formed either directly or indirectly by selective 
pressures; there are no other likely candidates for evolutionary causes of rape 
than these two.29) Elisabeth Lloyd, a philosopher of biology, points out that 
this assertion is hardly justified in modern evolutionary theory. Adaptation and 
the effect of adaptation, as Lloyd notes, are not exhaustive options for evolutionary 
explanations of a trait.30) Thornhill and Palmer’s pursuit to “explain all 
interesting traits in terms of selective forces alone”31) falls under the approach 
called adaptationism that has been criticized by philosophers of biology.
In this section, I will look more closely into what adaptationism is and 
demonstrate that Thornhill and Palmer’s account is grounded on their 
methodologically biased choice of adaptationism. I employ the taxonomy of 
adaptionism put together by Tim Lewens. Lewens distinguishes four kinds of 
adaptationism and divides them into seven sub-types.32) I argue that, among 
them, two forms of adaptationism are particularly at work in Thornhill 
and Palmer’s theory of rape: (i) strong pan-selectionism and (ii) strong 
heuristic adaptationism. 
Pan-selectionism refers to the belief that “natural selection is the most 
significant of the evolutionary forces that act on populations.”33) Evolutionary 
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biologists who endorse pan-selectionism value selection as the most important 
evolutionary force, while thinking of other evolutionary forces as unimportant.34) 
Thornhill and Palmer, in particular, hold a strong version of pan-selectionism 
that views selection as the most important and the only cause of evolution. 
They note that there are four evolutionary causes of traits
-
selection, drift, 
gene flow, and mutation
-
but quickly disregard the latter three as unlikely.35) 
It is this overemphasis on selection that enables the two authors to reach the 
conclusion that rape behavior must be directly or indirectly favored by 
selection, that is, rape must be an adaptation or a by-product of adaptations. 
Both Lloyd and Lewens effectively show that pan-selectionism is scientifically 
incorrect.36) Although I agree wholeheartedly with them, the purpose of the 
present article is not to scientifically debunk strong pan-selectionism and other 
forms of adaptationism. This article is concerned with the biased character of 
adaptionism. To do justice to Thornhill and Palmer, let me suppose that 80% 
of traits are directly or indirectly formed by selection, and the rest 20% of 
traits can be explained by other evolutionary forces, such as drift, gene flow, 
and mutation. Then it would be descriptively true that selection is the most 
common evolutionary force. Yet it does not follow that selection is the most 
important force or the only force that matters in explaining causes of a trait. 
The belief that the most common cause is the solely important one, and that 
less common causes can be dismissed as unimportant and unworthy of 
study, is an evaluative claim biased in favor of commonness.
Heuristic (or methodological) adaptationism, especially the strong version of 
it, is another form of adaptationism that underlies Thornhill and Palmer’s 
account. Unlike pan-selectionism, heuristic adaptationism does not present a 
hypothesis about what is the most significant factor in evolutionary process. 
33) Lewens(2009), 162.
34) Lewens(2009), 163-164.
35) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 56-59.
36) Lewens(2009), 163-164; Lloyd(1999), 223-226; Lloyd(2003). 239-247.
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Instead, it asserts that adaptation provides the best methodology to investigate 
evolutionary process. Lewens distinguishes between weak and strong heuristic 
adaptationisms.37) While the weak version states that we should assume that 
all traits are adaptations so as to best examine those traits that are actually 
adaptations, the strong version further contends that “only by beginning to 
think of traits as adaptations can we uncover their true status, whether they 
are adaptations or not.”38) Thornhill and Palmer employ this strong heuristic 
adaptationism in their work, when they acknowledge that “not all aspects of 
living organisms are adaptations” but maintain that it is still “essential to 
consider the concept of adaptation in all cases of possible phenotypic design, 
because only then can it be determined if a trait has been designed by natural 
selection [or not].”39) Note that this is Thornhill and Palmer’s evaluative 
claim as opposed to a purely descriptive claim. The judgment that the only 
and the best way to investigate a trait is to regard it as an adaptation, even 
though it could turn out later that the trait is not an adaptation, is Thornhill 
and Palmer’s overvaluation of the methodological significance of adaptation. 
This specific biased judgment constructs their theory of rape, according to 
which rape behavior should be considered as an adaptation or as a by-product 
of adaptations. 
In sum, both types of adaptationism employed by Thornhill and Palmer are 
not pure descriptions of evolution, but rather are scientifically and 
methodologically biased approaches reflecting their preference in theorization of 
evolution. The biasedness of adaptationism indicates that Thornhill and Palmer 
cannot accuse feminist critics of committing the naturalistic fallacy, that is, the 
fallacy of deriving normative conclusions from descriptive statements. Thornhill 
and Palmer’s rape-evolution account is biased, in that it holds only because 
they disproportionately favor adaptation and disregard other ways to explain 
37) Lewens(2009), 162, 169-171.
38) Lewens(2009), 162; emphasis added.
39) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 9-10.
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and examine evolution. Thus, when feminist critics analyze how the 
evolutionary account of rape being “naturally selected” contributes to the idea 
of rape being “not morally wrong,” they are deriving normative implications 
from the biased/evaluative claim, not a factual/descriptive one (i.e., their 
critical analyses do not amount to the naturalistic fallacy). 
2.2. Willful Ignorance of Cultural and Social Context 
There is a tendency in evolutionary psychology to ignore cultural and social 
contexts of human behavior. This ignorance is not a simple mistake of failing 
to know, which might be considered epistemically and morally innocent. 
Rather, it is “willful ignorance,” a case of “knowing that [one does] not 
know, but not caring to know.”40) Ignorance in this sense has received 
considerable attention of social epistemologists since Charles Mills’s 
groundbreaking book The Racial Contract coined the term “epistemology of 
ignorance.” Mills notes that there is an agreement among white people not to 
care to know about racial oppression facing people of color, and to 
misinterpret the world as if there is little or no racism. Through this active 
ignorance, white people maintain the status quo racially unjust world.41)
Carla Fehr, along with many other feminist philosophers of science and 
epistemologists, analyzes gender/sex injustice issues through the lens of 
epistemology of ignorance. Fehr examines the comments that the then-president 
of Harvard University Lawrence Summers made in 2005 on why there were 
so few women in top science and engineering jobs. Using the so-called 
“variability hypothesis,” which claims that “there is more variation in aptitude 
among men than among women [and thus] there will be more men than women 
with extremely high aptitude,”42) Summers attributed the dearth of women in 
science to biological and genetic factors, while downplaying effects of 
40) Tuana(2006), 4-5; cited in Hall(2012), 41.
41) Mills(1997), 17-19.
42) Fehr(2008), 105.
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socialization and discrimination.43) This exemplifies willful ignorance, in that:
there [was] already a large body of research that provide[d] evidence 
contrary to Summers’s conjectures. […] What is sexist about Summers’s 
remarks are that they ignore evidence about women’s actual abilities, they 
ignore the need to encourage talented women to remain in the sciences, and 
they reinforce sexist stereotypes about women in the face of abundant 
contrary evidence.44)
Despite the huge body of knowledge that debunked the variability 
hypothesis, such as the literature revealing that gender bias and discrimination 
plays a crucial role in the professional assessment of women in academia,45) 
Summers chose to not count it as (real) knowledge and to remain ignorant of it. 
I argue that a similar mechanism of the epistemology of ignorance operates 
in evolutionary psychology. Thornhill and Palmer state as if rape were a 
single, uniform behavior across cultures. Although there is an extensive 
amount of research on cultural variations in rape, some of which I will 
discuss below, Thornhill and Palmer choose to not know them. It is this 
willful ignorance that allows them to explain rape in terms of universal 
evolution regardless of cultural differences. To put it more generally, an 
evolutionary account of a human behavior can assert its cross-cultural/universal 
validity only when the researcher does not care to know about social science 
and humanities research on the significant role of socio-cultural factors in 
shaping and explaining the behavior. Here, Thornhill and Palmer make a 
biased value judgment to exclude the knowledge on social/cultural contexts of 
rape from the realm of (real) knowledge, just as Summers did.
In particular, the two authors use a strategy to dismiss feminist accounts of 
rape as “ideology,” the opposite of the true “science” that they are doing.46) 
43) Fehr(2008), 109-110.
44) Fehr(2008), 113.
45) See Fehr(2008), 111 for more details. Recent research includes MacNell et 
al.(2015) and Mitchell and Martin(2018).
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For example, they cite Peggy Sanday’s work with the Minangkabau of West 
Sumatra, Indonesia as an example of feminist accounts of rape, which shows 
that the Minangkabau ethos of mutual respect between the sexes contributes to 
making their society virtually rape-free.47) However, instead of representing 
Sanday’s research fairly and taking the existence and analysis of rape-free 
society seriously, Thornhill and Palmer do not care to know about it. They 
assert that “some frequency of rape is typical of Homo sapiens [and] there is 
no evidence of a truly rape-free society”48) That is, for Thornhill and Palmer, 
research like Sanday’s does not amount to “evidence.” How so? Because it is 
mere political ideology, not real scientific knowledge. This way, Thornhill and 
Palmer do not need to know or engage in the “social science study of rape” 
(they lump a variety of analyses from feminist theories and social sciences 
into the single category).49)
To be sure, Thornhill and Palmer apparently refuse genetic determinism. 
That a behavior is genetically determined indicates that it is “rigidly fixed by 
genes and hence not alterable except by changing those genes.”50) As noted 
in the following, the two authors deny the deterministic view: 
[The absence of evidence of a truly rape-free society] does not mean, of 
course, that rape is a genetically determined act unaffected by learning and 
culture. It means only that human males in all societies so far examined in 
the ethnographic record possess genes that can lead, by way of ontogeny, to 
raping behavior when the necessary environmental factors are present, and 
that the necessary environmental factors are sometimes present in all societies 
46) This strategy is known as the “Galileo Defense,” which basically says: “I 
am telling the Truth and doing excellent science, but because of ideology 
and ignorance, I am being persecuted.” (Lloyd 2003, 235). 
47) Sanday(1981; 2003).
48) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 142.
49) They write, “intertwining of explanations of rape and political ideology 
has caused the naturalistic fallacy to a truly impressive role in the social 
science study of rape” (Thornhill and Palmer 2000, 125).
50) Thornhill and Palmer(200), 110.
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studied to date.51)
Nevertheless, this passage shows that Thornhill and Palmer do not give 
actual weight on cultural factors. Although they acknowledge that rape 
behavior might be influenced by cultural context, they do not take cultural 
variation of rape seriously. Rather, they seem to be more concerned with the 
uniformity of rape across cultures. The passage above claims that genes that 
can lead to rape as well as the environmental factors necessary for rape are 
present in all societies. An underlying assumption here is that a single thing 
called “rape” exists (or, at least, can exist) across societies. 
This assumption, however, has been refuted by feminist philosophers and 
social scientists. As Rachel Martin points out, rape is “a behavior whose very 
existence depends on the intentions and reactions of at least two complex 
social beings in some particular context.”52) What act amounts to rape is 
closely linked to intentions, such as those to rape, to resist, and to consent to 
sex. But intentions cannot be identified without considering complex contexts 
in which the social beings are situated, for instance, “what are the social 
norms governing sexuality in this place and time, what are the rights of 
women, the obligations of men, what is proper conduct for women during sex, 
how is force exerted or resisted.”53) Since these contexts vary profoundly 
according to culture and society, rape cannot exist as a single, uniform behavior.
To illustrate cultural variation, Martin cites the traditional model of East 
Asian marriage, according to which marriage was a contract between two 
families that gave the husband sexual access to his wife. There was no room 
in this model for “the consent of the wife,” or more precisely, “the wife’s 
right not to consent.” It would be misleading to use the (contemporary) 
Western notion of consent to distinguish between what is marital rape and 
51) Thornhill and Palmer(2001). 142; emphasis added.
52) Martin(2003), 369.
53) Martin(2003), 372.
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what is not, as the cultural contexts underlying this model might always 
regard the wife as having “consented to sex” by getting married.54) The 
meaning of rape not only varies across cultures, but it changes greatly over 
time within a culture. For example, rape had been regarded mainly as 
“property theft” until the early modern period of Western history, in which 
the wife had been considered as the patriarchal property.55)
In short, Thornhill and Palmer’s research is grounded on their evaluative 
choice to stay ignorant of socio-cultural context surrounding rape. It is this 
willful ignorance, which is an epistemically and morally suspicious choice, that 
enables Thornhill and Palmer’s evolutionary approach to rape. Given that it 
cannot hold up without willful ignorance, their research conclusion that “rape 
is a cross-cultural, universal behavior that is naturally selected” is a biased 
evaluative claim, not a purely factual claim. Therefore, feminist critics of their 
evolutionary accounts of rape do not commit the naturalistic fallacy of 
inferring value/ethical from fact/natural. They are inferring value (i.e., 
problematic social, ethical implications) from value (i.e., biased evaluative 
choice to dismiss sociocultural context of rape), not from fact.  
2.3. Binary Understanding of Gender and Sex 
So far, this paper has discussed as to how Thornhill and Palmer’s reduction 
of the entire rape behavior to adaptation (section 2.1) with no attention to 
sociocultural factors (section 2.2) is a biased evaluative move, which makes 
their evolutionary account of rape based thereon is a biased evaluative 
statement, not a purely factual one as they claim it to be. The current section 
focuses on the authors’ projection of two discrete sets of images of human 
males and females. Thornhill and Palmer’s account is grounded on a binary 
understanding of gender/sex56) that reflects androcentric, hetero- and cis-normative 
54) Martin(2003), 368-369.
55) Martin(2003), 372-373.
56) In this paper I use the term “gender/sex” to refer to both “gender” and 
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biases in society.
Explaining rape in terms of adaptation, Thornhill and Palmer take male 
reproductive success to be the driving force of adaptation. That is, rape is an 
adaptation favored by selection “because it increased male reproductive 
success”57) or a by-product of other adaptations favored by selection “because 
of their promotion of male reproductive success.”58) How does rape contribute 
to male reproductive success? The following scenarios, according to Thornhill 
and Palmer, illustrate the ways in which rape offers reproductive benefits:
[R]apists are predicted to deliver large ejaculates because rape would 
consistently have been associated with high sperm competition in human 
evolutionary history. The woman’s resistance during rape is expected to be 
perceived by the rapist as indicating that she has an investing consensual 
mate. Also, rape in warfare is expected to have often involved multiple men 
inseminating a victim over a short period of time, with men often copulating 
in the presence of other men and placing their sperm in competition with the 
sperm of others.59)
Raping an unwilling pair-bonded mate may be a male tactic of sperm 
competition. A woman’s sexual unreceptivity may suggest to her partner that 
she is having consensual intercourse with another male. Because men 
associate sexual unwillingness and resistance in their long-term mates with 
infidelity, sexual unwillingness may lead to sexual jealousy, and sometimes to 
rape as a sperm-competition tactic.60)
“sex.” Gender/sex is an umbrella term that Sari van Anders coined to 
note that gender (social) and sex (biological) cannot be easily disentangled 
(van Anders 2015, 1181). Multiple research programs on the impacts of 
gender, sex, and their interactions with other social variables on the 
subject phenomena, including Harvard’s recent project on COVID-19 and 
gender/sex disparities, use this term gender/sex “in order to emphasize the 
continuous and dynamic relationships between biology, behavior, and 
social structures” (Danielsen and Noll 2020).
57) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 59.
58) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 63.
59) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 74.
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As these rape scenarios show, Thornhill and Palmer’s evolutionary 
psychology depicts the male as a being who is primarily, if not exclusively, 
driven by the interest in reproductive success. In contrast, the female is 
depicted only as a means of reproduction. Males are always represented as 
sperm producers, and females are represented as receivers of sperm. These are 
the only two “normal”
-
and in this sense, “right”
-
sex roles that Thornhill and 
Palmer’s theory designates to males and females respectively. The male agent 
whose behavior is not driven by the interest in reproductive success and the 
female agent who is in the age of fertility but does not perform the role of 
means of reproduction are not allowed in Thornhill and Palmer’s theory. 
Relatedly, the authors leave no room for human beings who do not conform 
to such “correct” male vs. female sex roles defined in terms of reproduction. 
As Ann Caroline Danielsen and Nicole Noll aptly note, this kind of binary 
framework exhibits and naturalizes cis- and hetero-centric conceptualizations of 
gender/sex. “This perpetuates the invisibility of intersex, trans, non-binary, 
genderqueer, and other individuals who live their lives beyond the binary.”61) 
Thornhill and Palmer’s dichotomous framework is closely related to other 
assumptions that they make on gender/sex and rape. Discussing to what extent 
the evolutionary account of rape constitutes “bad science,” Michael Kimmel 
notes that Thornhill and Palmer make two “bad assumptions”: first, that rape 
is only about sex, and second, that sex is only about reproduction. Neither of 
these is supported by empirical evidence. Counterexamples include prison rape 
and gang rape, which are not only about sex but also about power and 
domination,62) and the rape of men by other men, of prepubescent children, and 
of postmenopausal women, which are not intercourse with fertile women and 
thus undermine the account of rape as a biological imperative for reproduction.63)
60) Thornhill and Palmer(2000), 77.
61) Danielsen and Noll(2020).
62) Kimmel(2003), 224-225.
63) Lloyd(2003), 240.
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A possible counterargument from Thornhill and Palmer is that evolutionary 
psychology does not explain all current human behaviors as adaptations. That 
is, they might claim that rape was evolved as an adaptive program in 
ancestral environments to increase reproductive success, but there is no 
guarantee that it is so in modern environments.64) 
In addition, it is also possible for evolutionary psychologists to argue for a 
modest, revised evolutionary account, namely, that rape is mostly (though not 
exclusively) about sex and sex is mostly about reproduction. For example, 
Thornhill and Palmer might contend that human males in general are driven 
by the interest in reproductive success and females in general are choosier 
than their male counterparts65) and suggest empirical evidence supporting these 
predictions. In this case, I would argue that the problem is not with empirical 
evidence per se but also with the way it is interpreted: Thornhill and Palmer 
presuppose the binary between promiscuous male vs. the choosy female and 
interpret evidence in a way that it fits the binary, while dismissing variations. 
They rely on the dominant interpretive mechanism in biology that Helen 
Longino argues contrasts with ontological heterogeneity. According to this 
anti-heterogeneity mechanism, “entities that are not members of the privileged 
class [are treated] either as epiphenomena […] or as variants whose deviations 
from the standard can be disregarded.”66) Similarly, Letitia Meynell notes:
If one believes one has evidence for two different modules that underlie 
differences in sex behavior and are part of jointly universal human male and 
female natures, then it is appropriate to treat variance in the behavior itself 
as noise. […] The simplistic evolutionary assumptions (especially modularity) 
direct the interpretation of the results toward finding [two distinct forms of 
64) Tooby and Cosmides(2005), 17.
65) Following Darwinian sexual selection, Thornhill and Palmer assume that 
“males will be less discriminating about and more eager to copulate with 
females than vice-versa,” and that this difference between males and females 
will account for the root of human rape (Thornhill and Palmer 2000, 38).
66) Longino(1995), 393.
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behavior], actively suppressing as uninteresting the overlap between the sexes 
and the variation among individuals within sex groups.67)
This mechanism of suppressing diversity operates in Thornhill and Palmer’s 
account of rape. Focusing solely on the binary sex roles that they believe to 
be “correct,” Thornhill and Palmer regard the existence of males who are not 
sex-driven and that of intersex, trans, and queer people merely as “noise” or 
“epiphenomenon.” The judgment that the dichotomous sex roles deserves an 
almost exclusive focus of research and the variation can be disregarded is an 
evaluative one, not a factual description of what is. This evaluative judgment 
reflects the hetero-cis-normative and sexist bias of society, which takes the 
male vs. female binary for granted and marginalizes non-heterosexual and 
non-cis individuals. If the variance is taken more seriously, the theory of male 
sex-driven evolution will not be maintained. In sum, Thornhill and Palmer’s 
evolutionary psychology is grounded on their biased choice of disregarding the 
variation and diversity in human sex behavior, and thus does not provide a 
purely empirical description of rape. 
3. Conclusion: Social Implications of Evolutionary Psychology 
This article has critically examined the three types of evaluative move on 
which Thornhill and Palmer’s evolutionary psychology of rape is grounded. 
First, it employs two forms of adaptationism: strong pan-selectionism and 
strong heuristic adaptationism. Both forms of adaptationism are not purely 
descriptive, but instead indicate Thornhill and Palmer’s overvaluation of the 
ontological and methodological importance of adaptation. Second, Thornhill and 
Palmer assume that rape constitutes a unitary behavior existing in all societies. 
In so doing, they make a biased epistemic judgment not to bother to know 
67) Meynell(2012), 14, 16; see also Roughgarden(2013), 3.
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the extensive contrary evidence suggesting that rape varies according to 
cultural and social contexts. Lastly, when interpreting biological data, Thornhill 
and Palmer disregard the diversity of sex, gender, and sexuality and 
exclusively focus on two discrete sex roles, which reflects cis-hetero-normative 
bias in society. 
In that Thornhill and Palmer’s account of rape cannot be sustained without 
the three biased evaluative moves, it is not a pure description of rape. 
Therefore, the accusation of the naturalistic fallacy against their feminist critics 
is unjustified, as it is not the case that feminist critics are deducing social and 
ethical value statements from descriptive, factual statements. Perhaps the most 
problematic value judgment operating in evolutionary psychology is the very 
assumption that the evolutionary explanation of human behavior is irrelevant to 
social implications
-
namely, that evolutionary psychology is just doing “science” 
and the “social consequence is none of its business. Feminist philosophers 
have long argued, as I discussed in this paper, the account of rape being 
natural perpetuates the rape culture of society that prompts and condones the 
crime. It is irresponsible for evolutionary psychologists to denigrate all such 
feminist critiques as the naturalistic fallacy, simply mentioning that they have 
no intent to legitimize rape. I conclude by quoting Kim Hall, who notes that 
this assumption itself shows evolutionary psychology’s willful ignorance: 
Biological explanations of human nature have historically advantaged those 
who approximate bodily norms and those with economic, gender, race, and 
sexual privilege. Why should we assume that science is now free of this 
history? It seems the only way to believe that such mistakes are no longer 
possible is to ignore the fact that science is a social practice, influenced by 
culture and history.68)
68) Hall(2012), 42.
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<국문요약>
진화심리학, 강간, 자연주의적 오류
공 유 진 
(오리건주립대학교 조교수)
진화심리학에 대한 페미니즘적 비판은 종종 자연주의적 오류를 저지른
다는 반론에 직면한다. 즉, 진화심리학의 기술적인 설명으로부터 규범적
인 결론을 이끌어내는 오류를 저지른다는 것이다. 본 논문의 목적은 이
러한 자연주의적 오류 논증을 논박하는 데 있다. 이를 위해 나는 어떻게 
진화심리학의 설명이 전적으로 기술적인 것이 아니라 편향적인 가치판단
에 기반하고 있는지 분석할 것이다. 톤힐과 파머의 저작 강간의 자연사
를 중심으로, 나는 강간에 대한 진화심리학적 설명이 (1) 진화에 대한 적
응주의적 접근, (2) 문화적, 사회적 맥락에 대한 의도적인 무지, (3) 성에 
대한 이분법적 이해라는 세 가지 편향성에 의존하고 있음을 입증할 것이
다. 이와 같은 편향적 가치판단에 의존하지 않고서는 톤힐과 파머의 진
화심리학적 설명이 성립하지 않는다는 점을 고려할 때, 톤힐과 파머가 
강간에 대해 전적으로 사실적, 기술적으로 설명하고 있다고 보기 어렵다. 
따라서, 그들의 진화심리학 이론에 대한 페미니즘적 비판은 가치판단이 
들어가지 않은 기술적 설명으로부터 규범적 결론을 이끌어내는 것이 아
니므로, 자연주의적 오류를 저지르는 것이 아니다.
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분법
접수일: 2021년 08월 15일/ 심사일: 2021년 08월 24일~09월 25일/ 게재확정일: 2021년 09월 18일
